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By Jason R. Smith1 
“Old scarred marble floors in a cold white corridor.  A room 
where the mad sat at their work.  To Suttree they seemed like 
figures from a dream, something from the past . . . .  He’d 
never been among the certified and he was surprised to find 
them invested with a strange authority, like folk who’d had to 
do with death some way and had come back, something about  
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them of survivors in a realm that all must reckon with soon or 
late.”2 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The insanity defense has long been viewed as one of the 
most controversial areas of substantive criminal law. 3  The 
public perception of the insanity defense is that it “is a 
commonly used device that allows criminals who deserve to be 
punished to escape any sort of retribution.”  4  In truth, the 
insanity defense “is a device that is rarely used and even more 
rarely successful” with “most defendants who are able to 
successfully raise it . . . spending an immense . . . amount of time 
under state-supervised hospitalization, treatment, and 
institutionalization.”5  
The insanity defense plays a major role in Tennessee 
criminal law despite its infrequent use because “[m]ental 
disease or defect does not otherwise constitute a defense” 
outside the statutorily provided definition of insanity. 6 
Therefore, criminal law practitioners in Tennessee must 
contend with the insanity defense as it is now codified 
regardless of the controversies surrounding it. Or, as the 
Tennessee Supreme Court stated in 1827, “[w]hatever 
differences of opinion there may be as to the construction and 
operations of the mind of man, whatever difficulty in 
discovering the various degrees of unsoundness, it is only 
necessary for us to ascertain the kind of prostration of intellect 
which is requisite to free a man from punishment for crime by 
                                                 
2 CORMAC MCCARTHY, SUTTREE 431 (Vintage International 1992) (1979) 
(describing the patients at the now closed Lakeshore Mental Health 
Institute in Knoxville, Tennessee). 
3 See James F. Hooper, M.D, The Insanity Defense: History and Problems 
25 St. Louis U. Pub. L. Rev. 409 (2006). 
4 Louis Kachulis, Note, Insane in the Mens Rea: Why Insanity Defense 
Reform is Long Overdue 26 S. Cal. Interdisc. L. J. 357, 362 (2017) (noting 
that the insanity defense “is raised in less than 1 percent of all criminal  
cases, and is thought to be successful in no more than 30 percent of 
those cases”).   
5 Id. 
6 TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-11-501(a) (2018). 
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the law of the land.”7  
Consequently, Part I of this article will examine the 
current state of the insanity defense in Tennessee and the most 
common issues that arise when it is litigated. Part II of this 
article will provide a general overview of the present version of 
the insanity defense, looking at its background, the procedural 
prerequisites for raising it, and its elements. Part III will 
examine the burden of proof for the insanity defense. Part IV 
will discuss the scope of expert testimony with respect to the 
insanity defense. Part V will examine what happens after the 
insanity defense has been litigated at trial, looking at the 
appellate standard of review and the procedure upon a verdict 
of not guilty by reason of insanity. Part VI will briefly examine 
some issues related to the insanity defense such as “diminished 
capacity,” sentencing, and post-conviction claims. 
 
II. THE INSANITY DEFENSE IN TENNESSEE 
 
A. BACKGROUND 
 
Insanity is a legal term of art and not a medical 
diagnosis. 8  In Tennessee, the insanity defense is codified at 
Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-11-501 which states in 
full: 
(a) It is an affirmative defense to prosecution 
that, at the time of the commission of the acts 
constituting the offense, the defendant, as a 
result of a severe mental disease or defect, was 
unable to appreciate the nature or wrongfulness 
of the defendant’s acts. Mental disease or defect 
does not otherwise constitute a defense. The 
                                                 
7 Cornwell v. State, 8 Tenn. (Mart. & Yer.) 147, 156 (1827). 
8 See 41 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 2D 615 Insanity Defense § 1 (Apr. 2018 
Update) (noting that insanity “is a legal and not a medical question”); 
Insanity, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (noting that insanity 
“is a legal, not a medical, standard”). The term “insanity” is “used in 
different criminal law settings” and “frequently encountered in legal  
situations quite outside the criminal law.” WAYNE R. LAFAVE, 1 SUBST. 
CRIM. L. § 7.1(a) (3d ed.). With the exception of some limited 
discussion in Part VI, this article will focus on the insanity defense. All 
other uses of the term “insanity” are beyond the scope of this article. 
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defendant has the burden of proving the defense 
of insanity by clear and convincing evidence. 
 
(b) As used in this section, “mental disease or 
defect” does not include any abnormality 
manifested only by repeated criminal or 
otherwise antisocial conduct. 
 
(c) No expert witness may testify as to whether 
the defendant was or was not insane as set forth 
in subsection (a). Such ultimate issue is a matter 
for the trier of fact alone. 
 
Subsection (a) is the operative part of the statute. Subsection 
(b) is designed to deny the insanity defense “to psychopaths, 
i.e., those repeat offenders without other medically discernible 
symptoms.”9 Subsection (c) addresses the scope of expert 
witness testimony with respect to the insanity defense. 
 The original version of section 39-11-501 was modeled 
on the standard found in the American Law Institute’s Model 
Penal Code that had previously been adopted by the 
Tennessee Supreme Court.10 However, section 39-11-501 was 
significantly amended in 1995 and has not been amended 
since.11 The current version of section 39-11-501 was 
“patterned after and virtually identical to the federal Insanity 
Defense Reform Act of 1984.”12 The Insanity Defense Reform 
Act of 1984, which was designed to “tighten the traditional 
insanity rule,” was enacted in response “to a large public 
outcry” following the acquittal by reason of insanity of John 
Hinckley, Jr. for the attempted assassination of President 
Ronald Regan.13 Likewise, “[t]he 1995 amendment [of section 
                                                 
9 TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-11-501 (2018), Sentencing Comm’n cmts. 
10 See TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-11-501 (1989), Sentencing Comm’n cmts.; 
Graham v. State, 547 S.W.2d 531, 543-44 (Tenn. 1977) (adopting the 
Model Penal Code standard). 
11 TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-11-501 (1995); State v. Holder, 15 S.W.3d 905, 
910 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999) (acknowledging the amendment and 
comparing the previous and current versions of section 39-11-501). 
12 Holder, 15 S.W.3d at 911. 
13 Kachulis, supra note 4, at 360. 
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39-11-501] was an obvious expression of legislative intent to 
restrict the defense of insanity.”14 As such, any caselaw 
involving a pre-July 1, 1995 offense should be considered 
highly suspect even though such caselaw still appears in 
treatises and annotations to section 39-11-501. 
 
B. PROCEDURAL PREREQUISITES 
 
Pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 12.2, 
a defendant who intends to assert the insanity defense at trial 
must “notify the district attorney general in writing and file a 
copy of the notice with the [trial court] clerk.”15 The State is not 
required to make “a triggering request.”16 Instead, “[t]he 
burden is upon the defendant to give notice of any defense 
based upon [a] mental condition.”17 The notice must “be given 
within the time provided for the filing of pretrial motions or at 
such later time as the court may direct.”18 Rule 12.2 gives the 
trial court the discretion to “allow the defendant to file the 
notice late, grant additional trial preparation time, or make 
other appropriate orders” when “cause [has been] shown.”19 
Failure to comply with the written notice requirement bars the 
defendant from raising the insanity defense at trial.20   
Rule 12.2 also requires that written notice be provided 
to the district attorney general and a copy filed with the trial 
court clerk if the defendant “intends to introduce expert 
testimony relating to a mental disease or defect or any other 
mental condition of the defendant bearing on the issue of his or 
her guilt.”21 This is because “lack of notice about the 
defendant’s mental state may seriously disadvantage the 
                                                 
14 Holder, 15 S.W.3d at 910-11. 
15 Tenn. R. Crim. P. 12.2(a)(1) (2018). 
16 Tenn. R. Crim. P. 12.2 (2018), Advisory Comm’n cmt. 
17 Id. 
18 Tenn. R. Crim. P. 12.2(a)(2). It should be noted that Rule 12.2 
requires that this notice be provided sooner than Tennessee Code 
Annotated section 39-11-204(c)(1) which states that written notice of 
an affirmative defense shall be provided “no later than ten . . . days 
before trial.” 
19 Id. 
20 Tenn. R. Crim. P. 12.2(a)(3) (2018). 
21 Tenn. R. Crim. P. 12.2(b)(1) (2018). 
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district attorney general in preparing possible rebuttal proof.”22 
This notice must also be given “within the time provided for the 
filing of pretrial motions or at such later time as the court may 
direct.”23 The trial court “may exclude the testimony of any 
expert witness offered by the defendant on the issue of the 
defendant’s mental condition” if the defendant fails to comply 
with the notice requirement.24 
In addition to the notice requirements, the trial court 
“may order the defendant to submit to a mental examination by 
a psychiatrist or other expert designated in the court order” 
upon motion of the district attorney general.25 Statements of the 
defendant made “in the course of any examination conducted 
under” Rule 12.2(c), as well as testimony about those 
statements, are not “admissible against the defendant in any 
criminal proceeding, except for impeachment purposes or on 
an issue concerning a mental condition on which the defendant 
has introduced testimony.”26 The trial court may exclude the 
testimony of the defendant’s expert witness if the defendant 
“does not submit to an examination ordered under Rule 
12.2(c).”27 Given the harshness of its penalties, Rule 12.2 should 
be closely examined and followed if there is a possibility that 
the defendant’s mental condition will be an issue at trial. 
 
C. ELEMENTS OF THE INSANITY DEFENSE 
 
The elements of the insanity defense found in the 
current version of section 39-11-501 are as follows: “at the time 
of the commission of the acts constituting the offense, the 
defendant, as a result of a severe mental disease or defect, was 
unable to appreciate the nature or wrongfulness of the 
defendant’s acts.”28 Put another way, the elements of the 
                                                 
22 Tenn. R. Crim. P. 12.2 (2018), Advisory Comm’n cmt. 
23 Tenn. R. Crim. P. 12.2(b)(2) (2018). 
24 Tenn. R. Crim. P. 12.2(d) (2018). 
25 Tenn. R. Crim. P. 12.2(c)(1) (2018). 
26 Tenn. R. Crim. P. 12.2(c)(2) (2018). 
27 Tenn. R. Crim. P. 12.2(d) (2018). 
28 TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-11-501(a) (2018). This is in sharp contrast 
with the original version of section 39-11-501 which “allowed the 
defense, ‘if, at the time of such conduct, as a result of mental disease 
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insanity defense are that the defendant, at the time of the 
offense, (1) suffered from a severe mental disease or defect, and 
as a result (2) was unable to appreciate either (a) the nature or 
(b) the wrongfulness of their acts. 
The first element is that, at the time of the offense, the 
defendant suffered from a severe mental disease or defect. The 
1995 amendment to section 39-11-501 added the requirement 
that the mental disease or defect be “severe.”29 What constitutes 
a severe mental disease or defect is not defined by the statute. 
However, examples from caselaw include schizophrenia,30 
delusional disorder,31 bipolar disorder with psychotic 
episodes,32 schizoaffective disorder,33 brief psychotic disorder,34 
moderate mental retardation,35 and major depression.36 In most 
cases, this element will not be disputed at trial.37   
Instead, the outcome of an insanity defense case will 
usually turn on whether the defendant has established the 
second element of the defense, that the defendant was unable 
to appreciate either the nature or the wrongfulness of their acts. 
Whether the defendant “understood the nature of his actions or 
                                                 
or defect, the person lacked substantial capacity either to appreciate 
the wrongfulness of the person’s conduct or to conform that conduct 
to the requirements of law.’” Holder, 15 S.W.3d at 910 (quoting TENN. 
CODE ANN. § 39-11-501 (1991)).  
29 TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-11-501(a) (1995); Holder, 15 S.W.3d at 910 
(recognizing the change in the statutory language). 
30 State v. Flake, 114 S.W.3d 487 (Tenn. 2003); Holder, 15 S.W.3d at 905. 
31 State v. Hank Wise, No. M2012-02520-CCA-R3-CD, 2014 WL 992102 
(Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 13, 2014). 
32 State v. Kennedy, 152 S.W.3d 16 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2004). 
33 State v. Colvett, 481 S.W.3d 172 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2014); State v. 
John Stephen Steele, No. E2006-00039-CCA-R3-CD, 2007 WL 2681784 
(Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 13, 2007). 
34 State v. Michael Halliburton, No. W2015-02157-CCA-R3-CD, 2016 
WL 7102747 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 6, 2016), perm. app. denied (Tenn. 
Apr. 13, 2017). 
35 State v. Ann Marie Thornton Kelly, No. M2001-01054-CCA-R3-CD, 
2002 WL 31730874 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 5, 2002). 
36 State v. Daryl Keith Holton, No. M2000-00766-CCA-R3-DD, 2002 
WL 1574995 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 17, 2002), aff’d, State v. Holton, 126 
S.W.3d 845 (Tenn. 2004). 
37 See, e.g., Colvett, 481 S.W.3d at 197; Kennedy, 152 S.W.3d at 22; 
Holder, 15 S.W.3d at 912. 
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. . . the wrongfulness of his actions” are “two separate prongs,” 
and “a defendant need only prove one prong to be successful in 
his defense.”38 The inability of the defendant to appreciate the 
nature of their acts is illustrated by the “oft-cited example” of a 
defendant who strangles their spouse but believes that they are 
“squeezing lemons.”39 As for the term “wrongfulness,” it is not 
defined in the statute.   
The Tennessee Pattern Jury Instructions characterize 
“wrongfulness” as the defendant’s inability “to understand 
what [they were] doing was wrong.”40 The Tennessee Court of 
Criminal Appeals has held that this instruction is “a complete 
and correct charge of the current law concerning an insanity 
defense.”41 The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals has also 
interpreted the term “wrongfulness” as including both legal 
and moral wrongfulness.42 Having examined the background 
and the elements of the current version of the insanity defense, 
the next sections will address several common issues that arise 
with it. 
 
III. THE BURDEN OF PROOF 
 
The most significant change in the 1995 amendment to 
section 39-11-501 was to alter the burden of proof for the 
insanity defense.43 Prior to the 1995 amendment, section 39-11-
501 “provided that insanity was simply a ‘defense.’”44 Also 
under the original version of section 39-11-501, “if the evidence 
adduced raised a reasonable doubt as to the defendant’s sanity, 
the burden of proof then fell upon the [S]tate to establish sanity 
                                                 
38 State v. Richard Anthony Arriola, No. M2007-00428-CCA-R3-CD, 
2009 WL 2733746, at *7 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 26, 2009). 
39 LAFAVE, supra note 8, at § 7.1(b); see also T.P.I.-Crim. 40.16 (2018) 
(characterizing this prong as a defendant’s inability to understand 
what they were doing). 
40 T.P.I.-Crim. 40.16 (2018). 
41 Wise, 2014 WL 992102, at *16 (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(quoting State v. Brian Val Kelley, No. M2001-00461-CCA-R3-CD, 
2002 WL 927610, at *25-26 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 7, 2002)). 
42 State v. Robert E. Odle, No. M2014-00349-CCA-R3-CD, 2014 WL 
6607013, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 21, 2014). 
43 Holder, 15 S.W.3d at 910. 
44 Id. 
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beyond a reasonable doubt.”45 To that end, the State could 
present “any ‘evidence which [was] consistent with sanity and 
inconsistent with insanity.’”46 
In contrast, the current version of section 39-11-501 
provides that insanity “is an affirmative defense to 
prosecution” and that “[t]he defendant has the burden of 
proving the defense of insanity by clear and convincing 
evidence.”47 Section 39-11-501 now “places the burden of 
establishing [the] affirmative defense [of insanity] squarely on 
the defendant.”48 While the State “is required to prove all 
essential elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt, sanity 
is not an element of a crime.”49 As such, the Tennessee Supreme 
Court has “explicitly reject[ed] the notion that the State must 
rebut defense proof of insanity with substantial evidence.”50 
“In determining whether a defendant is insane, [the trier 
of fact] is entitled to consider all the evidence offered, including 
the facts surrounding the crime, the testimony of lay witnesses, 
and expert testimony.”51 The trier of fact “may not arbitrarily 
ignore evidence,” but it is “not bound to accept the testimony 
of experts [when] the evidence is contested.”52 In light of this, 
the State will likely attempt to counter the defendant’s proof of 
insanity “by contrary expert testimony, lay witnesses, or 
vigorous cross-examination designed to undermine the 
credibility of the defense experts” even though that the State is 
not required to rebut the defendant’s proof with substantial 
evidence.53 
The current version of section 39-11-501 makes the 
defendant’s burden of proving insanity exceptionally heavy. 
This difficulty is illustrated in the caselaw on the insanity 
                                                 
45 Id. 
46 Id. 
47 TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-11-501(a) (2018). Evidence is clear and 
convincing when “there is no serious or substantial doubt about the 
correctness of the conclusions drawn from the evidence.” Hodges v. 
S.C. Toof & Co., 833 S.W.2d 896, 901 n.3 (Tenn. 1992). 
48 State v. Flake, 88 S.W.3d 540, 554 (Tenn. 2002). 
49 Holder, 15 S.W.3d at 911. 
50 Flake, 88 S.W.3d at 554. 
51 Id. at 556. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. at 554. 
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defense since the 1995 amendment took effect. For example, the 
Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed a trial court’s 
rejection of the insanity defense in State v. Holder despite two 
expert witnesses having testified that the defendant was unable 
to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct.54 Instead, the 
trial court “relied primarily upon the actions and words of the 
defendant before, at[,] and after the commission of the 
offense.”55   
Likewise, the Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed a 
jury’s rejection of the insanity defense in State v. Flake in spite of 
the fact that four expert witnesses testified that the defendant 
was unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct and 
a fifth expert witness testified that the defendant felt morally 
justified in his conduct.56 Instead, the court noted that “the facts 
surrounding the offense suggest[ed] [that] the defendant 
realized his conduct was wrongful.”57 The court relied on the 
fact that the defendant shot only the victim, that he fled after 
the shooting, that he “appeared to realize he had committed a 
crime” at the time of his arrest, and that he exhibited “no bizarre 
behavior” at the time of his arrest.58 
By contrast, the sole example of a Tennessee appellate 
court applying the current version of section 39-11-501 of a 
defendant having satisfied the burden of proof is State v. 
Kennedy.59 In Kennedy, the jury convicted the defendant of 
                                                 
54 15 S.W.3d at 909, 911-12. 
55 Id. at 912. 
56 88 S.W.3d at 544-48, 556-57. 
57 Id. at 556. 
58 Id. 
59 152 S.W.3d at 16. In State v. Flake, the Tennessee Court of Criminal  
Appeals originally held that the defendant had established insanity 
by clear and convincing evidence at trial and modified the jury’s 
guilty verdict to not guilty by reason of insanity, but that opinion was 
reversed by the Tennessee Supreme Court and the jury’s verdict was 
reinstated. Flake, 88 S.W.3d at 542; see also State v. Christopher Flake, 
No. W2001-00568-CCA-R3-CD, 2002 WL 1298773 (Tenn. Crim. App. 
June 12, 2002), rev’d, 88 S.W.3d 540 (Tenn. 2002). The Tennessee Court 
of Criminal Appeals made similar holdings in two other cases prior to 
the Tennessee Supreme Court’s decision in Flake. State v. Luis 
Anthony Ramon, No. W2001-00389-CCA-R3-CD, 2002 WL 1841608 
(Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 9, 2002), perm. app. granted (Tenn. Dec. 23, 
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vehicular homicide and three other offenses, but the trial court 
granted the defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal on the 
grounds that she had established insanity by clear and 
convincing evidence.60 The State appealed and the Tennessee 
Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision.61 
In making its decision, the trial court relied on the fact that three 
experts testified that the defendant suffered from bipolar 
disorder with psychotic episodes and that she could not 
appreciate the nature or wrongfulness of her actions, that there 
was nothing in the defendant’s conduct leading up to the 
offense to counter that opinion, that the defendant’s statement 
after the offense “clearly evidence[d] continuing delusion,” and 
that there was no evidence that the defendant was 
malingering.62 
It is highly unlikely that an appellate court would 
overturn a trier of fact’s rejection of the insanity defense in an 
instance when the defense and the State have presented 
conflicting expert testimony. As illustrated by the cases 
discussed above, it is still very unlikely that an appellate court 
would reverse a guilty verdict even when the experts agree in 
favor of insanity so long as there is evidence in the record 
countering the Defendant’s claim of insanity. The Kennedy 
opinion provides the only caselaw for defense counsel to 
favorably compare to a defendant’s case while attempting to 
distinguish the plethora of unfavorable decisions issued since 
                                                 
2002); State v. Claude W. Cheeks, No. E2001-00198-CCA-R3-CD, 2002 
WL 1609743 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 22, 2002), perm. app. granted (Tenn. 
Dec. 23, 2002). Then Judge Joseph M. Tipton filed dissenting opinions 
in both cases arguing that the defendants’ convictions should have 
been affirmed on appeal.  Cheeks, 2002 WL 1609743, at *9-11; Ramon, 
2002 WL 1841608, at *7-8. The Tennessee Supreme Court granted 
permission to appeal in both cases and remanded the cases to the 
Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals for reconsideration in light of 
the supreme court’s Flake opinion; the defendants’ convictions were 
affirmed upon remand. State v. Luis Anthony Ramon, No. W2002-
03084-CCA-RM-CD, slip op. at 1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 29, 2003); 
State v. Claude W. Cheeks, No. E2002-03083-CCA-RM-CD, 2003 WL 
22362766, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 17, 2003).     
60 152 S.W.3d at 17. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. at 22. 
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the 1995 amendment of section 39-11-501. 
   
IV. THE SCOPE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY 
 
Another issue that commonly arises with the insanity 
defense is the scope of expert testimony. Subsection (c) of 
section 39-11-501 was added in the 1995 amendment and 
provides as follows: “No expert witness may testify as to 
whether the defendant was or was not insane as set forth in 
subsection (a). Such ultimate issue is a matter for the trier of fact 
alone.”63 Subsection (c) is unusual as it is an aberration from 
Tennessee Rule of Evidence 704 which provides that 
“[t]estimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise 
admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate 
issue to be decided by the trier of fact.” In fact, “[i]n Tennessee 
the only ultimate issue about which an expert explicitly cannot 
offer an opinion is whether the defendant was or was not sane 
at the time of commission of the criminal offense.”64 
The unusual nature of subsection (c) has caused 
considerable confusion about the scope of expert testimony as 
it relates to the insanity defense. This is best illustrated by State 
v. Hank Wise.65 In that case, the defense’s expert witness testified 
that the defendant “was unable to appreciate the wrongfulness 
of his conduct at the time of the offense due to his [suffering 
from] delusional disorder.”66 The State’s expert witness 
“declined to give an opinion as to whether the [d]efendant 
could appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct because he 
felt that was an issue to be decided by the trier of fact.”67 Neither 
expert was correct in their interpretation of what was 
permissible under subsection (c). The defense’s expert 
“exceeded the scope of permissible testimony” while the State’s 
                                                 
63 TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-11-501(c) (1995). 
64 State v. Shuck, 953 S.W.2d 662, 663 n.3 (Tenn. 1997); see also Tenn. R. 
Evid. 704 (2018), 1996 Advisory Comm’n cmt. (noting that “[o]ne 
ultimate issue is outside the scope of expert testimony” and citing 
section 39-11-501(c)). 
65 2014 WL 992102, at *15-16. 
66 Id. at *15. 
67 Id. 
32                     5 LMU LAW REVIEW 2 (2018) 
expert “unnecessarily” narrowed the scope of his testimony.68 
Subsection (c) is construed “narrowly because of the 
interests at stake” and its unusual nature.69 An expert witness 
“may testify that the defendant suffered from a severe mental 
disease or defect.”70 An expert witness “may also state whether 
the defendant could have appreciated the nature or 
wrongfulness of his conduct at the time of the offense.”71 
However, the expert cannot state “that the severe mental 
disease or defect operated to prevent the defendant from 
appreciating the nature or wrongfulness of his conduct.”72 Put 
another way, an expert witness’s testimony cannot connect the 
two elements of the insanity defense. To illustrate, an expert 
witness may testify about everything except for what has been 
stricken through in the following statement: The Defendant, at 
the time of the offense, (1) suffered from a severe mental disease 
or defect, (2) was unable to appreciate either (a) the nature or 
(b) the wrongfulness of their acts.   
 
V. POST-TRIAL PROCEDURES 
 
In most cases the trier of fact will reject the insanity 
defense and convict the defendant at the conclusion of trial. On 
appeal, the standard of review is very deferential to the trier of 
fact’s verdict. A “verdict rejecting the insanity defense [will be 
reversed] only if, considering the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the prosecution, no reasonable trier of fact could 
have failed to find that the defendant’s insanity at the time of 
the offense was established by clear and convincing 
evidence.”73 This standard is similar “to the familiar sufficiency 
standard which appellate courts apply” when reviewing the 
                                                 
68 Id. at *16. 
69 State v. Perry, 13 S.W.3d 724, 742 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999). 
70 Id. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. 
73 Flake, 88 S.W.3d at 554. This is also the standard of review that 
applies on the rare occasion when the State appeals a trial court’s 
granting of a motion for judgment of acquittal on the grounds that the 
defendant established insanity by clear and convincing evidence. 
Kennedy, 152 S.W.3d at 22 n.1. 
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sufficiency of the convicting evidence.74 “Where the proof is 
contested, appellate courts should rarely reverse a jury’s 
rejection of the insanity defense under this deferential standard 
of review.”75 This deferential standard of review is likely part 
of the reason why the State often seeks to put on rebuttal proof 
even though it has no burden to do so. 
On the other hand, should the defendant be found not 
guilty by reason of insanity, the trial court will order the 
defendant “to be diagnosed and evaluated” by “the community 
mental health agency or licensed private practitioner 
designated . . . to serve the court.”76 Based upon that evaluation, 
the trial court can either: (1) release the defendant; (2) release 
the defendant subject to mandatory outpatient treatment; or (3) 
have the defendant involuntarily committed.77 However, if the 
charge was first degree murder “or a Class A felony offense 
under title 39, chapter 13,” then the trial court must either 
commit the defendant or release the defendant subject to 
mandatory outpatient treatment.78  
If the defendant is involuntarily committed, due process 
entitles the defendant to release “when he has recovered his 
sanity or is no longer dangerous.”79 Tennessee Code Annotated 
section 33-6-602 provides for release to mandatory outpatient 
treatment if the defendant “is likely to participate in outpatient 
treatment with a legal obligation to do so” but “not likely to 
participate . . . unless legally obligated to do so.”80 Tennessee 
Code Annotated section 33-7-706 provides for release to 
                                                 
74 Flake, 88 S.W.3d at 554. However, a challenge to the trier of fact’s 
rejection of the insanity defense on appeal is not technically a 
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence as the two appella te 
standards of review are “similar but not identical.” Odle, 2014 WL 
6607013, at *4 n.2. 
75 Flake, 88 S.W.3d at 556. 
76 TENN. CODE ANN. § 33-7-303(a)(1) (2018). 
77 TENN. CODE ANN. § 33-7-303(b) (2018). 
78 TENN. CODE ANN. § 33-7-303(g) (2018). Title 39, chapter 13 contains 
“offenses against person.” 
79 Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 368 (1983). 
80 TENN. CODE ANN. § 33-6-602(1) (2018). See State v. Kenneth Ryan 
Mallady, No. M2010-02142-CCA-R3-CD, 2012 WL 76901 (Tenn. Crim. 
App. Jan. 10, 2012), for a more detailed discussion of release to 
mandatory outpatient treatment under section 33-6-602. 
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voluntary outpatient treatment if the defendant “is likely to 
participate in outpatient treatment without being legally 
obligated to do so.”81 It should be noted that Tennessee Code 
Annotated section 33-7-303 was amended in 2017 to provided 
that if the charged offense was first degree murder or a Class A 
felony from title 39, chapter 13, then a committed defendant can 
only be released to mandatory outpatient treatment.82 
 
VI. RELATED ISSUES 
 
A. “DIMINISHED CAPACITY” 
 
“Diminished capacity” is often mistakenly referred to as 
a defense and raised in conjunction with the insanity defense.83 
However, “diminished capacity” is “merely a rule of 
evidence.”84 “While the law presumes sanity it does not 
presume mens rea.”85 To that end, “evidence which tends to 
prove or disprove the required mental state is relevant and 
generally admissible under Tennessee law.”86 The term 
“diminished capacity” refers to a defendant’s presentation of 
expert testimony “aimed at negating the requisite culpable 
mental state.”87  Expert testimony admissible under the rule of 
“diminished capacity” is not limited to just psychiatric 
testimony, but includes any other form of expert testimony 
                                                 
81 TENN. CODE ANN. § 33-6-706(2)(C) (2018). See State v. David Cloar, 
No. E2015-01069-CCA-R3-CD, 2016 WL 4054948 (Tenn. Crim. App. 
July 27, 2016), for a more detailed discussion of release to voluntary 
outpatient treatment under section 33-6-706. 
82 TENN. CODE ANN. § 33-7-303(g) (2018). Subsection (g) also provides 
that the trial court is to review the defendant’s need for outpatient 
treatment after six months and annually thereafter if mandatory 
outpatient treatment is deemed to still be necessary.   
83 See, e.g., Holton, 126 S.W.3d at 858-60; Holder, 15 S.W.3d at 913; 
Halliburton, 2016 WL 7102747, at *12-14. 
84 State v. Hall, 958 S.W.2d 679. 689 (Tenn. 1997) (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Pohlot, 827 F.2d 889, 897 (3rd 
Cir. 1987)). 
85 Id. (quoting State v. Phipps, 883 S.W.2d 138, 149 (Tenn. Crim. App. 
1994)). 
86 Id. 
87 Id. at 688. 
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“regarding a defendant’s capacity to form a requisite mental 
state.”88   
To be admissible under the “diminished capacity” rule, 
expert testimony “must demonstrate that the defendant’s 
inability to form the requisite culpable mental state was the 
product of a mental disease or defect, not just a particular 
emotional state or mental condition.”89  When a defendant is 
attempting to disprove the culpable mental state with this type 
of expert testimony, section 39-11-501(c)’s prohibition on expert 
witnesses testifying about the ultimate issue in the case does not 
apply.90 In fact, the opposite is true. The expert witness must 
testify about the ultimate issue of fact for their testimony to be 
admissible under the “diminished capacity” rule. 
 
B. SENTENCING 
 
Defendants will also typically argue in conjunction with 
the insanity defense that their sentence should be mitigated due 
to their suffering from a mental condition.91 The trial court can 
consider that the defendant “was suffering from a mental or 
physical condition that significantly reduced the defendant’s 
culpability for the offense” as a mitigating factor in deciding the 
length of the defendant’s sentence.92 However, the 
enhancement and mitigating factors are merely advisory.93 
Furthermore, trial courts are given wide discretion in 
sentencing matters and “a trial court’s misapplication of an 
enhancement or mitigating factor does not invalidate the 
sentence imposed unless the trial court wholly departed from 
the 1989 [Sentencing Reform] Act, as amended in 2005.”94 Given 
this deferential standard of appellate review, it behooves any 
                                                 
88 State v. Ferrell, 277 S.W.3d 372, 379 (Tenn. 2009).  
89 Hall, 958 S.W.2d at 690. 
90 State v. Lesergio Duran Wilson, No. M2014-01487-CCA-R9-CD, 
2015 WL 5170970, at *11 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 2, 2015). 
91 See, e.g., Wise, 2014 WL 992102, at *13-14, 18-19; State v. Timothy 
Wade Davis, No. E2003-02162-CCA-R3-CD, 2004 WL 2378251, at *13-
15 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 25, 2004), aff’d, State v. Davis, 185 S.W.3d 
338 (Tenn. 2006); Kelly, 2002 WL 31730874, at *22. 
92 TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-35-113(8) (2018). 
93 TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-35-210(c) (2018). 
94 State v. Bise, 380 S.W.3d 682, 706 (Tenn. 2012). 
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defendant seeking application of this mitigating factor to make 
a strong showing and argument for it to the trial court during 
the sentencing hearing. 
 
C. POST-CONVICTION 
 
Failing to present an insanity defense or to investigate 
the petitioner’s mental health history is a common claim of 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel raised in post-conviction 
proceedings.95 But to successfully raise such a claim on post-
conviction, the petitioner needs “to present the testimony of an 
expert at the evidentiary hearing to explain what, if any, mental 
health evidence trial counsel should have advanced at trial.”96 
However, “the state is not required to provide expert assistance 
to indigent non-capital post-conviction petitioners.”97 This lack 
of funding for expert assistance will bar most post-conviction 
petitioners from successfully raising such a claim of ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel.98 
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
 
The rationale behind the insanity defense “is that those 
                                                 
95 See, e.g., George Timmons v. State, No. E2017-00335-CCA-R3-PC, 
2018 WL 1391630 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 20, 2018); Phillip Alexander 
McWilliams v. State, No. E2017-00275-CCA-R3-PC, 2017 WL 5046354 
(Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 2, 2017); Tyler James Schaeffer v. State, No. 
E2016-01614-CCA-R3-PC, 2017 WL 4477345 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 6, 
2017). 
96 Demario Johnson v. State, No. W2011-02123-CCA-R3-PC, 2013 WL 
772795, at *8 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 27, 2013) (citing Black v. State, 794 
S.W.2d 752, 757 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990)). 
97 Davis v. State, 912 S.W.2d 689, 696-97 (Tenn. 1995). 
98 A closely related issue, but outside the scope of this article, is that 
due process requires the tolling of the one-year statute of limitations 
for post-conviction actions when the petitioner’s mental  
incompetence prevents the petitioner from complying with the 
statute. Whitehead v. State, 402 S.W.3d 615, 623-24 (Tenn. 2013). The 
competency standard is whether the petitioner “possesses ‘the present 
capacity to appreciate [his or her] position and make a rational choice 
with respect to continuing or abandoning further litigation or . . . is 
suffering from a mental disease, disorder, or defect which may 
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who are mentally ill and cannot fully comprehend their actions 
should not, in justice, be held responsible for those actions.”99  
Moreover, from a policy standpoint “millions of mentally ill 
persons [clog] the [American] criminal justice system” as our 
courts “are not focused on treatment” of the chronically 
mentally ill.100 To that end, the insanity defense “allows for 
rehabilitation of the mentally ill,” “removes those from society 
who are dangerous,” allows “them to be treated so that they are 
no longer dangerous,” and “prevents the mentally ill . . . from 
being forced into a prison system where they will not receive 
proper treatment.”101   
In 2005, an attorney for a post-conviction petitioner 
asserted that since the 1995 amendment to section 39-11-501 no 
defendant had been acquitted by reason of insanity “in a 
contested jury trial.”102 It appears that this record has not 
improved in the subsequent 13 years as only one appellate 
decision since the 1995 amendment has concluded that the 
defendant established insanity by clear and convincing 
evidence. Given its infrequent use and the poor chance of 
success, it begs the question whether section 39-11-501 in its 
current form fulfills the rationale and public policy underlying 
the insanity defense. However, Tennessee attorneys will have 
to contend with the current version of the insanity defense as 
outlined in this article until the General Assembly sees fit to 
amend section 39-11-501 in an attempt to make it more 
responsive to that underlying rationale and public policy. 
                                                 
substantially affect the petitioner’s capacity.’” Reid ex rel. Martiniano 
v. State, 396 S.W.3d 478, 512-13 (Tenn. 2013) (quoting Tenn. Sup. Ct. 
R. 28, § 11(B)(1)). However, to survive summary dismissal, the 
petitioner must make a prima facie showing of mental incompet ence 
by submitting with the petition “affidavits, depositions, medical  
reports, or other credible evidence that contain specific factual  
allegations showing the petitioner’s incompetence.”  Id. at 512. 
99 Kachulis, supra note 4, at 358. 
100 Hooper, supra note 3, at 413. 
101 Kachulis, supra note 4, at 358-59. 
102 Kelley v. State, No. M2004-01158-CCA-R3-PC, 2005 WL 2255854, at 
*12 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 15, 2005). 
